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[Crim. No. 10930. In Bank. July 28,1961.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ODIE
WILLARD COFFEY, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-Amendment: Review
as A1fected by Record: Disposition of Cause.-A eourt'a
attempt to retlect its grant of an ambiguous prosecution
motion "'to strike the allegations of the Deadly Weapons Section" resulted in a record so confused as to require reversal of
the judgment with directions to undertake again all proceedings subsequent to entry of the verdict as may be necessary
where, after the accused had been found guilty on two counts
of assault with intent to commit murder (Pen. Code, § 217), and
four counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon the police
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b», all committed with an unlicensed
eoneealable weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022), the information and
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 1031, 1157, 1446
(1); [2] Criminal Law, §§ 1157, 1305; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 107,
107(23); [4, 6, 10] Criminal Law, § 1464; [5] Criminal Law,
§1465; [7,8] Criminal Law, §1463j [9] Criminal Law, §106;
[11] Witnesses, § 227; [12] Criminal Law, § 1382.2; [13] Criminal
Law, § 1378; [14] Criminal Law, § 1340; [15] Arrest, § 18; [16]
Criminal Law, § 1378(0.5); Arrest, § 18; [17] Criminal Law,
§ 1378(6).
lIt might also be urged that the toeboard requirement is not only to
protect persons below from injury due to falling objects but also to pr~
tect persons from fulling. In any event, it was error to refuse the offered
instruction.
-Retired Associate Justjce of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
t Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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the abstract of judgment were amended by substituting "dangerous" for "deadly" weapons and "Pen. Code, § 3024" (itself
relating to "deadly" weapons) for Pen. Code, § 12022," and
where the information on the other counts, on which sentence
was merely suspended, was left unchanged.
[2] Id.-Review as A1rected by Record: Discretion of Court-SentenciLg.-While a judgment and record remain so confused as
to render impossible any meaningful analysis of a purported
exercise of a trial court's discretionary powers as to sentencing, modification or correction by an appellate court is precluded.
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-The right to the
assistance of counsel at trial, the scope of which was enunciated in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d
799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733], applies retrospectively
without regard to time.
[4] Ido-Habitual Ofienders-Proceedings Where Prior Conviction
Is in Issue-Constitutionality.-To the extent that statutory
machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is
activated by the presence of prior convictions, the constitutional basis of such convictions must be examined if challenged
by proper allegations.
[5] Ido-Habitual Ofienders-Proceedings as to Foreign Convictions-Burden of Proving Constitutionality.-To the extent
that any state makes its penal sanctions depend in part on the
fact of prior c5nvictions elsewhere, necessarily it must assume
the burden of meeting attacks on the constitutionality of such
prior convictions.
[6a-6c] Ido-Habitual Ofienders-Proceedings Where Prior Conviction Is in Issue-Constitutionality-Determinationo-When
an accused, prior to trial, raises the issue of the constitutionality of a prior conviction, whether by motion to strike the
prior on constitutional grounds or by denying it on constitutional grounds at the time of entering his plea thereto, the
court must, prior to trial, hold a hearing outside the presence
of the jury to determine the constitutional validity of the
charged prior, and must strike from the accusatory pleading
any prior conviction found to be constitutionally invalid.
[7] Id.-Habitual Offenders-Denial of Prior Oonvictions-Constitutional Grounds-Sufficiency of Allegation.-One seeking to
challenge the charge of a prior conviction on the ground of
[3] Constitutionally protected right of indigent accused to
appointment of counsel in state court prosecution, note, 93 A.L.R.
2d 747.
[6] See Cal.Juro2d, Witnesses, § 155; Am.Juro, Witnesses (1st
ed § 747 et seq).
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constitutional defects as to the right to counsel may do so only
through a clear allegation to the effect that, in the pt:0ceedings
leading to the prior conviction under attack, he neither was
represented by counsel nor waived the right to be so represented.
[8a, 8b] Id.-Habitual Offenders-Denial of Prior OonvictionConstitutional Grounds-Aid of Counsel ;Denied-Sufficiency
of Allegation.-A motion to strike a prior foreign conviction
was sufficient to justify a hearing in the trial court to determine whether, in the proceedings leading to that conviction,
defendant had been afforded his right to counsel (U.S. Const.,
6th and 14th Amends.), where the motion was supported by
clear allegations, in defendant's notice, points and authorities,
and in his attorney's declaration, that he had not been represented by counsel in such proceedings and that he had not
"clearly and expressly and intelligently" waived such right.
[9] Id.-Rights of Accused-Waiver.-A relinquishment of rights
unaccompanied by a state of mind capable of appreciating the
implications and consequences of such action is not a waiver
of such rights.
[10] Id.-Habitual Offenders-Proceedings Where Prior Conviction Is in Issue-Burdens of Proof and of Producing Evidence.
-In a hearing to determine the issue of the constitutionality
of a defendant's prior conviction, challenged on grounds of the
infringement of his right to counsel, the burden of proof as to
constitutionality remains with the prosecution and the prosecution .Drst has the burden of proving, prima facie, that such
conviction was suffered (Pen. Code, § 1025), but the burden of
producing evidence then shifts to the accused to show the
infringement (see Evid. Code, § 550), and if such burden is
borne, the prosecution then has the right to produce evidence
in rebuttal.
[11] Witnesses - Impeachment - Prior Unconstitutional Convictions-Error.-The use of a constitutionally invalid prior
conviction to impeach testimonial credibility is improper, and
to allow such impeachment is error under California law.
[12a, 12b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error
-Evidence of Other Convictions.-The use of a constitutionally invalid prior conviction for any purpose leading to a
conviction for a subsequent offense is a violation of due
process under U.S. Const., 14th Amend., and its prejudicial
effect must be assessed, on appeal, by application of the Chapfnan test, namely, whether the prosecution at the subsequent
trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict, the error being harmless if the likelihood of material influence was not within the realm of reasonable possibility.
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(13a, 13b] Id. - Appeal- Harmless and Reversible ErrorImpeachment.-Even assuming that a defendant's prior conviction had been obtained by an unconstitutional infringement
of his right to counsel, impeachment of his testimonial credibility by the use of such prior conviction at a subsequent trial
was not prejudicial per se, nor was the error committed by
allowing such impeachment over proper objection necessarily
prejudicial, where it was possible to make a meaningful assessment of prejudice on the record.
[14] Id.-Appeal-Errors Requiring Reversal-Infringement of
Basic Constitutional Rights.-There are some constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction, rendering
impossible a meaningful assessment of prejudice on the record,
can never be treated as harmless error.
[16] Arrest-Criminal Cases-Resistance to Arrest.-The legislative intent behind the enactment of Pen. Code, § 834a, was to
withdraw the former privilege of resistance to an unlawful
arrest, and, limiting the effect of the statute to cases of actual
arrest as opposed to detention for questioning, to remove
disputes as to their legality from the streets to the courtroom.
[16] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible ErrorImpeachment: Arrest-Criminal Cases-Resistance to Arrest.
-Under the Ohapman test, the People could not effectively
claim on ap~al that, by virtue of Pen. Code, § 834a, prohibiting resistance to arrest, a defendant might not have been
prejudiced by the impeachment of his testimony through the
potentially erroneous introduction of a prior felony conviction,
and that a verdict of guilty on two counts of assaUlting police
officers with intent to commit ~urder (Pen. Code, § 217) and
two counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon them (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (b», would necessarily have been reached
on the strength of defendant's testimony alone, where such
testimony denied that his gunshots were aimed at persons
identifiable as police officers or that he intended to injure
anyone, and would, if believed by the jury, have justified verdicts of no more than simple assault, and where, in any event,
Pen. Code, § 834a, did not apply to those counts, was not the
subject of a jury instruction and could not have supported the
element of intent to injure.
[17] Id. - Appeal- Impeachment - Error Harmless in View of
Other Evidence.-Under the Ohapman test, there was no reasonable possibility that the impeachment of defendant's testimonial credibility, through the potentially erroneous
introduction of a prior felony conviction, influenced the jury
in reaching its verdict of guilt on two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon upon two police officers (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.

[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 30; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 94.
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(b», where the officers unequivocally testified that defendant,
when ordered to drop his weapon and surrender, fired directly
at them, where, as against defendant's testimony that he did
so only after being fired upon when trying to surrender, the
officers had been specifically ordered not to· fire unless first
fired upon, and where the jury were properly instructed, under
CALJIC No. 52, that the presumption of truth-telling on the
part of a witness may be repelled by the interest of the.
witness in the case.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County. William L. Murray, Judge. Reversed with directions.
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Prosecution for assault with intent to commit murder, for
assault with a deadly weapon upon police officers, and for being
armed with a concealed weapon. Judgment of conviction reversed witll directions.

i
Wiener & Weiss and Robert A. Chrisman for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Richard H. ~ooper, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SULLIVAN, J.-Defendant was charged by information
with four. counts of assault with intent to commit murder
(Pen. Code, § 217) ; with four counts of assault with a deadly
weapon upon the person of a police officer (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (b» ; with being armed at the time of said offenses with
a pistol capable of being concealed upon the person without
having a license to carry such pistol (see Pen. Code,
§ 12022) ;1 and with having suffered a prior felony conviction
in the State of Oklahoma.
At trial the prosecution produced substantial evidence to
the following effect: On Saturday, October 31, 1964, about
5 :30 p.m. Officers Norenberg and Martin of the Anaheim
Police Department went to the home of defendant to question
him about an alleged misdemeanor hit-run violation. Failing
to see the vehicle reported to them as belonging to Coffey, the
officers parked about a block away and waited. About 6 p.m.
defendant drove up in a car answering the description given
IThis charge was not set forth in a separate count but was made by
reference a part of each of the eight specific counts. (See Pen. Code,
I 969c.)
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the police. The officers activated the red lights on their patrol
car and followed defendant who parked in the driveway,
emerged from the automobile, and started toward the door of
his home.
Officer Norenberg called to defendant that they would like
to speak to him. Defendant, ignoring the call, entered his
home and closed the door. The officers walked up to the door
and knocked upon it several times. Finally defendant's wife
opened the door and asked what they wanted. Officer Norenberg then replied, "We would like to speak to the man who
was driving this car." Mrs. Coffey inquired as to the purpose
of their visit. At this point defendant himself appeared and
told the officers that he would not speak to them unless they
bad an arrest warrant. Officer Norenberg replied "that we
could come in there and take him out, if need be." Defendant
disappeared into a room in the house and returned almost
immediately with two pistols. Pointing them at the officers,
who were stinding on the steps, he told them to leave his
property unless they had a warrant for his arrest. The officers
began to withdraw, and as they did so defendant "started
shooting." Officer Martin "felt some debris hit [him] in the
face" but he and Officer Norenberg retreated unhurt to their
patrol car and called for assistance. 2
Support arrived almost immediately and a rather extended
seige was laid to the Coffey residence by some 26 officers who
proceeded to force defendant's surrender wit~ tear gas. At
one point defendant appeared on the back patio of his house
carrying a pistol, whereupon Officer Thompson, stationed in
this area, called out to him, "Drop your gun and raise your
hands." In response defendant fired several shots at Officer
Thompson and at Officer Wilcox standing nearby. Wilcox
returned defendant's fire as the latter again withdrew into
the house.
A short time later, after the police had begun to lob tear
gas into the house, defendant began crawling out of a
window. He appeared to have a weapon in his hand and
Officer Wilcox called out to him to drop it and place his hands
on his head. Defendant crawled back inside and fired several
shots at Officer Wilcox and two other officers. Defendant was
finally overcome by officers who entered the house with gas
2The above is a summary of testimony given by Officer Martin. Officer
Norenberg was killed in an airplane crash shortly after the incident in
question and did not testify at trial.
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masks. In the final struggle, he received a superficial scalp
wound; no officers were hurt.
Of the eight counts charged in the information four related
to Officers Norenberg and Martin (2 counts, § 217; 2 counts,
§ 245, subd. (b)). The remaining four counts, charging the
same crimes,. related to Officers Thompson and Wilcox.
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity to the offenses charged. He stood mute as to the
allegation of being armed with an unlicensed concealable
weapon, and it was stipulated that he therefore denied that
allegation. He also denied the prior conviction.
Before the date set for trial defendant moved that. the portion of the information charging him with a prior conviction
be stricken on the ground that he had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in the proceedings
leading to that conviction. Filed in support of the motion was
the sworn· declaration of defendant's attorney, which set
forth the minute entry reflecting defendant's arraignment on
the 1949 chargeS and summarized further proceedings wherein defendant, in propria persona, entered a plea of guilty and
was sentenced to the state prison for five years.' In support of
the motion defendant filed points and authorities which stated
that he '.' was indigent at the time of his plea," that he "did
not understand his right to counsel," and that he "did not
clearly and expressly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel. "6 Pursuant to stipulation the motion was placed off
calendar, reserving to defendant the right to renew it at trial.
On the morning of the trial, and prior to its commencement,
the motion was heard in the judge's chambers without a
reporter. Though the proceedings at that time are therefore
'The indicated minute entry, dated April 30, 1949, read as follows:
"The State appearing by ita attorney, H. H. Brown, and the defendants
[Coffey and a codefendant] appearing in person. The defendants entered
a plea of guilty. After they were arraigned, they waived everything and
they were both told of the charge against them and advised of all their
Constitutional rights. They were bond [8ic] over to District Court of
Rogers County for trial and their bond [Bic] were set at 11000.00 each."
'The declaration indicated that the proceedings summarized therein.
would be established by official records to be introduced at hearing on the
motion to strike the prior.
Cilt appears that these all~g:ttioJls formed the basis of an application
to vacate and set aside the judgment and to withdraw the guilty pleasaid application being filed by defcndnnt in the sentencing Oklahoma
court some four and one-half mouths after he had been delivered to the
penitentiary. The court's denial of the motion was affirmed by the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals on May 23, 1951. (Coffey v. State (1951)
94 Okla. Crim. 327 [235 P.2d 546].)

.
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Dot set forth in the trial transcript, the court's ruling is
recited in the minutes: "The Court denies the motion without
a hearing on grounds that under California law, no such
motion can be entertained as it is irregular (People v. Sulli'Van, 206 Cal.App.2d 36 at p. 44 [23 Cal.Rptr. 558])." The
reporter's transcript indicates that this ruling was based 011
the lack of statutory authority for such a motion.
Upon denial of the motion, the court asked defendant
whether he would like to admit the prior, which he had earlier
denied. Counsel for defendant replied as follows: "We want
to admit it reserving the right to pursue whatever remedy is
available on the motion heretofore heard by the Court with
respect to striking the priors [sic]." The court thereupon
stated: "The record will so indicate that you are now admitting the Psior, but that it is not a waiver of any rights that
you have oti motions heretofore made in denying this or otherwise attack the validity of this prior." Defendant then, upon
advice of counsel, admitted the prior conviction.
In the course of the trial defendant testified in his own
behalf. Upon cross-examination he was asked whether he had
been convicted of a felony, and his counsel promptly objected:
". • • I would like to rephrase the objection we originally
made on this particular matter for the purposes of the record
that we might refer to." The court asked whether counsel
would like to "incorporate by reference. " Counsel replied in
the affirmative, and the court overruled the objection. Defendant then admitted that he had been convicted of larceny 16
years before in Oklahoma. In response to further questions, by
which the prosecutor apparently sought to establish that
defendant harbored some animosity toward police officers in
general, defendant represented that he had been "railroaded" in the proceedings leading to the Oklahoma
conviction.
The jury found defendant not guilty of the charges set out
in counts 1 and 2 of the information (assault with intent to
commit murder upon Officers Thompson and Wilcox). Defendant was found guilty of the charges set out in counts 3
and 4 of the information (assault with intent to commit
murder upon Officers Norenberg and Martin) and it was also
found that at the time of committing these offenses (i.e.,
counts 3 and 4) defendant "was armed with a pistol capable
of being concealed upon the person, without having a license
or permit to c·arry such firearm." Defendant was also found
guilty of the charges set out in counts 5 to 8 (assault with a

)

212

[67 C.2d

PEOPLE tI. COFFEY

deadly weapon upon the persons of all four officers named in
the first four counts). Having waived trial by jury on the
insanity defense, defendant was found by the court to have
been sane at the time of the offenses and at the time of trial.
Defendant made a motion for a new trial, the grounds of
which do not appear in the instant record. At his request the
hearing on the motion was advanced, whereupon the following
took place:
"MR. COLLINS [Attorney for defendant]: . . . The Court is
familiar with the situation here. I believe the People have a
motion which will issue to Part Four, Title Two, Chapter, 'MR. ENRIGHT [Deputy District Attorney]: Yes, your
Honor, People wish at this time to strike the allegations of the
Deadly Weapons Section, where there was a separate finding
on the 12022. 6
"THE COURT: The motion has been read, and let it be
stricken from the record, and the judgment entered, then.
"MR. COLLINS: Waive any further time, yo'ur Honor, and
request sentence at this time. "
After further colloquy between court and counsel, defendant's counsel withdrew his motion for a new trial and the
court imposed sentence on count 5 (assault with a deadly
weapon upon Officer Thompson) and suspended imposition of
sentence on all other counts. 'I It appears that the court, at the
.

I

!

~

..

.

6Section 12022 of the Penal Code provides in relevant part that' I Any
person who commits or attempts to commit any felony ••. while armed
with any pistol • • . eapable of being concealed upon the person, without
having a lic(lnse or permit to carry such firearm as provided by this
chapter, upon conviction of such felony or of an attempt to commit such
felony, shall in addition to the punishment prescribed for the crime of
which he has been convicted, be punishable by imprisonment in a state
prison for not less than five years nor more than 10 years," said additional term to run consecutively. As indicated above, the finding that
defendant had been armed with an unlicensed concealable weapon was
made only in relation to the two counts (3 and 4) wherein defendant was
found guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.
'I" THE COURT: Do I understand you wish to abandon your Motion for
New Trial'
"MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: I just want to make sure. I want to check the jury ver·
dict and make sure I have it on the right count.

.
.
""MR. COLLINS:

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

I believe, your Honor, Count 5, 6, 7 or 8 pertain to
245-b of the Penal Code, of which he was convicted.
"THE COURT: Right. I finally found it. There is a lot of paper in this
file. Count 5. Is there any legal cause why sentence should not he
imposed'
"Ma. COLLINS: None whatsoever.
"THE COURT: On Count 5 of thc Infonnation, as to which defendant
has been adjudged Guilty by the verdict of the jury, I sentence the de-
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time of pronouncing sentence or shortly thereafter, purported
to amend the information on its face in accordance with the
above-mentioned motion of the district attorney. We have set
forth the information as amended in the footnote. s
The minutes of the court reflect the motion of the district
attorney, the amendment of the information, and the rendition of judgment, in the following language: "Motion by the
People to strike the deadly weapon section. Motion granted.
The Information was amended by striking 'deadly weapon'
and inserting the words 'dangerous weapon.' The motion for
a new trial is withdrawn. No legal cause appearing why judg-ment should not now be pronounced, it is the judgment of the
Court that the defendant be sentenced to the State Prison for
the wrm prescribed by law on Count 5. The imposition of
sentence is suspended on Counts 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8." Apparently no reference was made at this time to the prior conviction.
The amended abstract of judgment described the crime
upon which defendant was sentenced as follows: "Assault
upon a Police Officer with a Dangerous Weapon, a lesser and
included offense contained in Sec. 245b of the Penal Code of
the State of California in violation of Section 245b of thb
Penal Code of the State of California . . ."9 The abstract
tendant to the State Penitentiary tor the term prescribed by law. The
Court suspends the imposition of sentence on aU other counts as to which
the defendant has been convicted."
8In the copy of the information appearing ill the clerk's traliscript on
appeal counts 5 through 8 charge defendant with "Violation of Section
2451.1 of the Pena\. Code of the State of California (Assault Peace Officer
with a <PUiJI:J ~t';()'/l (ldangerous weapon/) [not initialed]), in that
on or about the 31st day of October, 1964, in the County of Orange, State
of California, the said ODIE WILLARD COFFEY did willfully, unlawfully
nnd feloniously assault [named officer] with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a
pistol, at a time when the said [named officer] was a peace officer engaged
ill the performance of his duties and such fact was known and reasonably
should have been known by the said ODIE WILLARD CorRY." No alteration was made as to counts 3 and 4. and the paragraph charging violation of section 12022 was left unchanged.
9Section 245, subdivision (b). provides in relevant part that" Evel'y
person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or instrument or by
any means likely to produce great bodily injury upon the person of a
I)cace officer . . . and who knows or reasonably should know that such
victim is a peace officer . . . engaged in the performance of his duties,
when such peace officer . . . is engaged in the performance of his duties
shall be puuisllcd by imprisonment ill the state prison not exceeding 15
years; provided, that if such person hus previously been convicted of a
felony under the laws of this state or has previously been convicted of
an offense under the laws of any other state or of the United States
which, if committed in tMs state, would have been punishable as a felony,
he shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five years
to life."

~)

214

,

~

i,;-_ ,

::

:

~

.

PEOPLE 11. COFFEY

[67 C.2d

then recited defendant's prior conviction and went on as
follows: "Defendant was charged and was found to have been
armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of commission of
the offense, or a concealed dangerous weapon at the time of
his arrest within the meaning of Penal Code Sections 96ge
and 3024. "10
.
[1, 2] We deal first with the manifest difficulties presented by the record of judgment herein. We have concluded
that the court's abortive attempt to reflect in the information
and judgment the ambiguous motion of the district attorney
has resulted in a judgment and record so confused and uncertain as to render meaningful analysis impossible. This state of
the record, together with the fact that the court's action
represents a purported exercise of discretionary powers as to
sentencing, precludes present modification or correction by
this court. (cf. People v. Baca (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 487,
489-498 [55 Cal.Rptr. 681]), and we must therefore reverse
the judgment with directions to undertake again all such proceedings as may be necessary, or as may be raised by proper
future motions of the parties, subsequent to the entry of the
jury verdicts herein.
Defendant further urges that the trial court should not
have refused to hear his pretrial motion to strike the. prior
conviction. We agree.
.
[3] The right to the assistance of counsel at trial, the
scope of which was enunciated in Gideon v. Wainwright
(1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799,83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d
733], applies retrospectively without regard to time. (Doughty v. Ma·xwell (1964) 376 U.S. 202 [11 L.Ed.2d 650, 84 S.Ct.
702] ; United States v. LaVallee (2d Cir. 1964) 330 Jr.2d 303,
310-312; In re Woods (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 3, 5-6 [48 Cal.Rptr.
689,409 P.2d 913].) [4] Further, to the extent that statulOSection 96ge provides that "Whenever a defendant is armed with a
firearm or other weapon under such circumstances as to bring said defendant within the operation of Section 3024 of the Penal Code relating
to certain minimum penalties or of Section 12022 of the Penal Code,' I
that fact may be charged in the accusatory pleading, setting forth the
nature of the weapon, and must be separately determined at the trial.
Section 3024 provides in relevant part for certain minimum penalties
as to one armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the offense, or
possessing a concealed deadly weapon at the time of his arrest. The section goes on to define a deadly weapon "to include any instrument or
weapon of the kind commouly known as a blackjack, slung shot, billy,
sandclub, sand hag, metal knuckl('s, any dirk, dagger, pistol, revolver, or
any otlier firearm, any knife havillg a blade longer than five inches, any
razor with an unguarded blade and any metal pipe or bar used or intended
to be used as a club." ( Italics added.)
Section 12022 is set forth in relevant part at fn. 6, ante.
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tory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction
is activated by the presence of prior convictions, it is imperative that the constitutional basis of such convictions be
examined if challenged by proper allegations. (In re nToods,
supra, 64 Cal.2d 3; cf. In re Streeter (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 47
[56 Cal.Rptr. 824, 423 P.2d 976].) [5] The fact that a
.prior conviction was sustained in another jurisdiction does
not preclude such examination. "To the extent that any State
makes its penal sanctions depend in part on the f.act of prior
convictions elsewhere, necessarily it must assume the burden
of meeting attacks on the constitutionality of such prior convictions." (United States v. Jackson (2d Cir. 1957) 250 F.2d
349,355; see I'll re Woods, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 3, 5.)
,6a] Though these principles were first given application
in a series of cases involving collater·al attacks on final judgments (In re Woods, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 3; I'll re Luce (1966) 64
Ca1.2d 11 [48 Cal.Rptr. 694, 409 P.2d 918] ; I'll re Tucke1'
(1966) 64 Ca1.2d 15 [48 Cal.Rptr. 697, 409 P.2d 921]), it is
clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that
attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be
disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity, and we are
therefore of the view that, if the issue is properly raised at or
prior to trial, it must be determined by the trial court. Weare
further of the view that the procedure here sought to be
utilized, to wit, a motion to strike the prior before trial, is a
proper method by which to raise the issue and initiate proceedings to determine the constitutional va1idity of the prior
conviction.l l
[7] We emphasize, however, that the issue must be raised
by means of allegations which, if true, would render the prior
conviction devoid of constitutional support. "One seeking to
challenge prior convictions charged against him may do so
only through a clear allegation to the effect that, in the proceedings leading to the prior conviction under attack, he
'neither was represented by counsel nor waived the n:ght to be
so represented." (Original italics.) (People V. Merriam,
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d 390, 397 [58 Cal.Rptr. 1, 426 P.2d 161].)
[Sa] In the instant case defendant, by means of his notice
llThe constitutional basis of the inquiry at issue requires that a defendant be permitted to initiate the indicated proceedings even in those
cases wherein the Legislature has determined that the striking of prior
convictions can occur only upon motion of the prosecutor. (See Health
& Sni. Code, § 11718; People V. Sidener (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 645 [25 Cal.
Rptr. 697,375 P.2d 641].)

216

·
·

,!
I

·

i

.

,

PEOPLE tI. COFFEY

[67 C.2d

of motion, points and authorities, and declaration of attorney,
clearly alleged that he was not represented by counsel in the
course of the 1949 Oklahoma proceedings. He further alleged
that he "did not clearly and expressly and intelligently
waive his right to counseL"
The Attorney General contends that the latter allegation
does not constitute an allegation of nonwaiver as required by
Merriam. He relies upon the case of People v. DeJean (1967)
249 Cal.App.2d 220 [57 Cal.Rptr. 211]. There defendant
was charged with a violation of section 11501 of the Health
and Safety Code and with three prior convictions, two of
which were for violation of federal narcotics laws. He admitted the prior convictions and was found guilty of the substantive offense. 12 On appeal he, for the first time, alleged that in
the proceedings leading to the two prior federal narcotics
convictions he " 'did not have assistance of counsel, and did
not knowi'lyly waive any such assistance.'" (P. 233.) The
Court of Appeal undertook an examination of the records of
the prior convictions and determined that defendant had
waived his right to counsel as to each. The defendant's allegation that such waiver was not entered into "knowingly"
was considered too conclusory to merit a present factual
inquiry--:-especially in light of the facts (1) that defendant
offered no evidentiary support for the allegation and (2) that
the records clearly showed that defendant had been expressly
advised of his rights to counsel and had expressly waived the
same. (People v. DeJean, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 220, 231-234.)
The De Jean case cannot bear the weight sought to be placed
upon it by the Attorney General. First, the determination
there undertaken by the Court of Appeal is clearly one of the
nature sought to be prevented by our decision in People v.
Merriam, supra, 66 Ca1.2d 390.13 Second, it is clear that the
Court of Appeal in DeJean confused the matter of raising the
relevant issue with that of resolving it. [9] Defendant
DeJean's allegation that he had not waived counsel "knowingly" must clcarly be considered an allegation of nonwaiver, for a relinquishment of rights unaccompanied by a
state of mind capable of appreciating the implications and
12Section 11501 provides that the penalty for a first violation shall be
five years to life with a minimum of three years actual time served. The
penalty for violation with two prior narcotics offenses is 15 years to lite
witb a minimum of 15 years actual time served.
13In fairness to the Court of Appeal, it sbould be noted that the deci·
sion in DeJeOl1l. preceded by more than a month our deciaion in Merriam.
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consequences of such action is not a waiver of such rights. 14
The fact that the allegation was made" without the slightest
suggestion from him of any fact in support of that conclusion" (People v. DeJean, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 220, 233) is
relevant not to the raising of the issue, but rather to the failure
of defendant DeJean to produce evidence in support of it.
[8b] We hold that the allegations made by defendant in
support of his motion to strike the 1949 Oklahoma prior
conviction were sufficient to justify a hearing in the trial
court for the purpose of determining whether, in the proceedings leading to that conviction, defendant was accorded his
right to counsel in accordance with the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
[6b] Although the facts of this case do not call upon us to
delineate the nature of the contemplated hearing, we do so for
the guidance of courts and counsel who will be called upon to
deal with similar matters in the future: First, when a defendant,' whether by motion to strike the prior conviction or
convictions on constitutional grounds, or by denial of such
prior conviction or convictions on constitutional grounds at
the time of entering his plea to the same, raises the issue for
determination, the court shall, prior to trial, hold a hearing
outside the presence of the jury in order to determine the
constitutional validity of the charged prior or priors in
issue. [10] Second, in the course of such hearing the prosecutor shall first have the burden of producing evidence of the
prior conviction sufficient to justify a finding that defendant
"has suffered such previous conviction." (Pen. Code,
§ 1025.) Third, when this prima facie showing has been made,
the defendant shall thereupon have the burden of producing
evidence that his constitutional right to counsel was infringed
in the prior proceeding at issue.15 Fourth, if defendant bears
this burden, the prosecution shall have the right to produce
evidence in rebuttal. [6e] Fifth, the court shall make a
finding Qn the basis of the evidence thus produced and shall
14Compare the following language of the United States Supreme Court:
"The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and
understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." (Italics
added.) (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 516 [8 L.Ed.2d 70,
82 S.Ot. 884].)
15Though the burden of proof as to the constitutionality of the charged
prior conviction remains with the prosecution, and the burden of producing evidence rests initially with it, the latter burden shifts to the defendant upon proof of the fact of his having" suffered" the prior conviction.
(See Evid. Code, § 550.)
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strike from the accusatory pleading any prior conviction
found to be constitutionally invalid.
Our holding that the trial court should have heard defend.
ant's motion to strike the prior conviction does not, of c~urse,
necessarily require that there be an entire new trial. If, upon
remand, the trial court determines that no violation of
defendant's right to counsel occurred in the course of the
1949 Oklahoma proceedings, it should, in accordance with that
portion of this opinion dealing with ambiguity in the record
of judgment, undertake necessary and proper proceedings
subsequent to the entry of the jury verdicts. In the event,
however, that it is determined that the 1949 conviction is
invalid, the question then arises whether the use to which that
conviction was put at trial was improper.
It should first be noted that the prosecution's use at trial of
defendant.'s prior conviction can be viewed as serving two
purposes. First, the fact of the conviction was utilized to
impeach defendant's credibility after he had testified in his
own defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2051; see Evid. Code,
§ 788.)18 Second, defendant's subjective reaction to that
conviction was utilized to show motive for the offenses for
which defendant was on trial in the instant case. It would
seem, however, that the latter evidence would be properly
admissible even if the prior conviction were constitutionally
invalid, for the validity or invalidity of the judgment of
conviction is not relevant to the question of defendant's atti.
tudes and motives at the time of the incident for which he was
on trial in California. Therefore, if the prior was in fact
invalid, its only possible prejudicial effect upon the defense
lay in the impeachment of defendant's testimonial credibility.
[11] We are convinced that the use of a constitutionally
invalid prior conviction to impeach testimonial credibility is
improper, and that to allow such impeachment is error under
California law. (Cf. People v. Hamilton (1948) 33 Cal.2d 45,
50 [198 P.2d 873] ; Macfarlane v. Deparfment of Alcoholic
Beverage Control (1958) 51 Ca1.2d 84, 89 [330 P.2d 769] ;
People v. Banks (1959) 53 Ca1.2d 370, 382, fn. 7 [1 Cal.Rptr.
669, 348 P.2d 102].) [12a] Further, we are of the view
that such error is of federal constitutional dimension. It is
clear that a conviction of crime, no matter when sustained, is
16The jury was properly instructed as follows: "The fact that a wit·
ness had been convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may be considered
by you for only one purpose, namely, in judging the credibility of that
witness~ •.• " (CALJIC No. 54-B.)
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constitutionally invalid if it was obtained in violation of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Gideon v. Wainwright,
supra, 372 U.S. 335; Doughty v. Maxwell, supm, 376 U.S.
202; United States v. LaVallee, supra, 330 F.2d 303; In rc
Woods, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 3.) We think it equally clear that the
utilization of such a conviction, at the trial of a subsequent
offense, for any purpose leading to a conviction for such
subsequent offense, is violative of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, in assessing the prejudicial effect of such erroneous utilization, we are required to
apply the test recently set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17
L.Ed.2d 705, 87 8.Ct. 824].
[lSa] Preliminary to applying the indicated test in the
instant case, we reject defendant's contention that impeachment by means of a constitutionally invalid prior conviction is
per se prejudicial, and that error committed through allowing
such impeachment over proper objection cannot be considered
harmless under any circumstances. [14] "Although...
there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error, [fn.
omitted]" (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 23),
those rights are by their nature such that their infraction
renders impossible a meaningful assessment of prejudice on
the record.17 [13b] Such assessment is quite possible in the
instant case, and we therefore undertake the indicated task in
light of the entire record before us. [12b] Our inquiry, as
indicated above, is whether the prosecution has proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained. of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained." (Chapman v. California,
supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
As we have recently pointed out, the Chapman rule, wllile
requiring that we look beyond the probability of a different
result absent constitutional error, does not demand that a
conviction be reversed" for the sole reason that we might be
fible to conceive of some possibility, however remote, that a
jury c01lld have been marginally influenced" by such error.
(People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 712 [59 Cal.
Rptr. 124, 427 P.2d 788].) Rather, the rule requires reversal
17Among the indicated rights is that of the right to counsel at tria1.
(Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372 U.S. 335.) It must be emphasized,
however, that we are not here concerned with the bare right to counsel;
rather we are concerned with a derivative right to remain free from
impeachment of testimonial credibility by means of prior convictions
ohtained in vio]q,tion of the right to counsel.
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if, upon an examination of the entire record, it appears reasonably possible that the error might have materially influenced the jury in arriving at its verdict, and the error must
be considered harmless if the likelihood of material influence
is not within the realm of reasonable possibility. In the
circumstances of the instant case, the application of the indicated standard requires that we direct our attention to
defendant's courtroom testimony.
Defendant testified in substance that on the day in question
he left his place of business in the late afternoon and, after
stopping briefly at a tavern, became involved in a minor automobile collision; that, after giving proper identification and
again visiting a tavern, he drove to his home; that two police
officers came to his home and demanded that he accompany
them to police headquarters for questioning; that, when he
refused to. comply with this demand in the absence of a warrant, the officers commenced to curse at him in the presence of
his wife and children and one of them forced his way into .
defendant's home; that, when the officers refused to leave his
property, he got and exhibited two pistols in order to compel
them to leave; that when they still refused, he fired several
shots through a window in order to frighten them away; that,
upon the· arrival of additional police, he attempted to surrender but was fired upon and withdrew into the house, meanwhile returning fire in the general direction from which the
shots had come; that later, after the house had been filled
with tear gas, he attempted to leave through a window, but he
heard two shotgun blasts and withdrew into the house, again
returning fire in the general direction from which the blasts
had come; and that he was finally overcome by tear gas and
subdued by officers who entered his house. Defendant emphasized that he at no time had any intention of injuring or
taking the life of any police officer, and that he never aimed
his weapon at any person identifiable by him as such.
It is the contention of the Attorney General that even if we
take defendant's testimony at face value, the elements of each
of the crimes of which he was found guilty are established
therein, and that therefore he could not have been prejudiced
by impeachment. Reliance is placed upon section 834a of the
Penal Code, which provides as follows: "If a person has
Imowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have
knowledge, that he is being arrested by a police officer, it is
the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any
weapon to resist such arrest." [15] [See fns. 18, 19.] The
..\.tll.)rn~y G~lll!ral urg~ that ill \·i~w of the duty created by

July 1967]

PEoPLE

v.

COFFEY

(8'1 C.2d 204; 60 Cal.Rptr. 457. 430 P.2d 15]

/.--)-.

;;;...-

221

this statute,18 defendant's actions rendered him criminally
liable for the crimes of which he was found guilty-even if
the circumstances provoking those actions were in fact as he
alleged in his testimony.
There are three answers to this contention. First, section
834a concerns itself with arrest, not with detention for questioning. 19 [16] Since there was no evidence adduced at
trial to the effect that an arrest was in progress prior to
defendant's initial burst of gunshots, section 834a could at
most be applicable to the two counts involving Officers Wilcox
and Thompson.
Second, we note that the jury was. not instructed as to
section 834a, and we think that this fact precludes the Attorney General from having recourse to the section in order to
show that the error here in question would be harmless. The
question here is that of the effect of error upon a jury
instructed as the jury herein was instructed-not the effect of
such error upon a jury instructed as the People would now
prefer that it had been instructed.
Third and finally, defendant testified at trial that he had no
intention of harming or killing anyone and that he at no time
aimed his gunshots at any person identifiable by him as such.
It would seem clear that if defendant's testimony on this
point were believed by the jury, it could not properly find
violations of section 217 or section 245, subdivision (b), of the
18Prior to the adoption of section 834a by the 1957 Legislature, it was
the general rule that an officer making an unlawful arrest was not engaged
in the proper discharge of his duties and could be l'esisted by means of
reasonable foree. (See People v. Spinosa (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659,
664 [252 P.2d 409]; Jackson v. Superior Cour~ (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d
183, 189 [219 P.2d 879]; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp.
906, 914 [180 P.2d 465].) The enactment of section 834a clearly represents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the
street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated
privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California. (In re Bacon
(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 52-53 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322]; People v. Burns
(1961) 198 Cal.App.2d Supp. 839 [18 Ca1.Rptr. 921].)
19We do not reach this conclusion wholly by reference to the maxim
ezpressio ttnitts est ezclusio alterius. The report of the Senate Interim
Judiciary Committee concerned with the passage of section 834a, of
which we take judicial notice for the purpose of statutory interpretation
(see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d cd. 1966) § 154, pp. 148-149), clearly
shows that the statute, as originally referred to committee, forbade forceful resistance by one who knows 01' should know "that he is being
stopped, detainell for questioning, or arrested by a peace officer, .•. "
(Italics added.) (Fourth Progress Report to the Legislature by the
Senate Interim .Judiciary Committee (1957), Appendix to .Journal of the
Senate, vol. 1, pp. 426-427.) 'rllC deletion of the emphasized language ill
the statute as finally passed indicates a clear legislative intention that the
effeet of section 834a be limited to eases of actual arrest.
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Penal Code, for basic to the indicated varieties of aggravated
assault is the crime of simple assault. 20 "An assault is an
unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a
violen t injury on the person of another." (Pen. Code, § 240.)
"One could not very well 'attempt' or try to 'commit' an
injury on the person of another if he had no intent to cause
any injury to such other person. . . . The crime here involved, if defendant's testimony is accepted as true, would
seem to be a misdemeanor. 'Every person who, except in selfdefense, in the presence of any other person, draws or exhibits
any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any other deadly
weapon whatsoever, in a rude, angry or threatening manner,
or who in any manner, unlawfully u~es the same in any fight
or quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor.' (Pen. Code,
§ 417.) "21 (People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 768, 775 [228
P.2d 281].) Even if the jury had been instructed as to section
834a of the Penal Code, it is clear that a breach of the duty of
submission imposed by that section, absent any intent to cause
injury to a police officer, could not result in aggravated
assault of the varieties here charged.
For these reasons we must reject the contention of the
Attorney General that, because 'defendant's testimony itself
establishes' all elements of the crimes of which he was found
guilty, no prejudice could result from erroneous i;m.peachment
by means of a constitutionally invalid prior. As we have
shown, the vital element of intent to injure is certainly not
established by that testimony, and section 834a, even if it
were here applicable to all crimes at issue, could not supply
such intent. We therefore turn now to an assessment of the
effect of impeachment upon the jury's findings as to the
crucial elements of intent.
For 'these purposes it is helpful to consider in two categories the crimes of which defendant was found guilty. The
first category is comprised of counts 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the
information: assault with intent to commit murder (§ 217)
against Officers Norenberg and Martin, and assault with a
deadly weapon upon a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (b» against
the same persons. 22 In the second category are counts 5 and
jury was properly so instructed.
:!lTliC jury hercin was properly instructed that. section 417 sets forth a
leslie I" offense necelillarily included in those charged. (Cf. People v. Wilson
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d 749, 757-761 [59 Cu1.Rptr. 156,427 P.2d 820].)
220ur examination of tllC record convinces us that t.he four counts involving Norenherg and Martin (3, 4, 7, 8) all relate only to the single
incident at defendant's front door.
20Tbe

)

~

July 1967]

')

PEOPLE 1J. COFFEY
[67 C.2d 204; 60 Cal.Rptr. 457. 430 P.2d 15]

223

6: assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer against
Officers Wilcox and Thompson.
As to the first category we note that the record contains no
direct evidence to the effect that defendant intended to
murder or harm Norenberg or Martin. Defendant's testimony
expressly disclaims any such intent, and the testimony of
Officer Martin offers only circumstantial support which,
though certainly sufficient to support the finding of the jury,
is nevertheless weak. For instance, Officer ~Iartin testified that
after defendant had asked the officers to leave he appeared
with the pistols and pointed them" at" them, and that as the
officer began to withdraw defendant "started shooting."
Nowhere does Officer Martin state, as fact or opinion, that
defendant was directing his fire at them. Defendant's testimony was that he fired through the window alongside the
open front door in order to scare the officers, and the testimony of Officer Martin is supportive of this statement in that
he testified that he was struck by some "debris," presumably
broken glass, immediately after the first shots were fired.
Assuming that defendant's prior Oklahoma conviction is
determined to be invalid, we are of the view that, under the
above state of the evidence, there is a reasonable possibility
that erroneous impeachment of defendant's testimonial credibility by means of such prior conviction materially influenced
the jurY in arriving at its verdicts as to counts 3, 4, 7, and 8;
we therefore conclude as to these counts that the prosecution
has not proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
(Ohapman v. Oalifornia, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
[17] As to the second category, the assault with a deadly
weapon 'upon Officers Wilcox and Thompson, there was precise
and unequivocal testimony by the officers involved that
defendant, when requested to drop his weapon and surrender"
turned and fired directly at them. Further, there was physical
evidence to the effect that bullets fired at this time by defendant struck very near the officers. Defendant's story, of course,
was that the officers opened fire upon him when he was trying
to surrender, and that he returned their fire and ran back into
the house. However, there was also evidence to the effect that
the officers were under explicit instructions not to fire upon
defendant unless fired upon. We also consider the fact that
the jury was properly instructed that the presumption of
truth-telling on the part of a witness may be repelled by the

224

-~)

-

.

_i

..

, i"

d,,
-

. t
"

-

I

,

-, -i-

t, L
!
:

~-

,
t

- ;

,-

I-

!

!

i"

PEOPLE tI. COFFEY

[67 C.2d

interest of that witness in the case. 23 Assuming that defendant's prior Oklahoma conviction is determined to be invalid,
and viewing the evidence and instructions as a whole, we are
of the view that there is no reasonable possibility that erroneous impeachment of defendant's testimonial credibility by
means of such prior conviction materially influenced the jury
in arriving at its verdicts as to counts 5 and 6; we therefore
conclude as to these counts that the prosecution has proved
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained." (Chapman v. Calif()rnia, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.)24
Defendant finally contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts. We deem it too clear to warrant
extended discussion that the testimony of the several officers
here involved, if believed, was generously ample to support
the verdicts rendered.
It appears from the foregoing that the judgment must be
reversed. Upon remand the trial court is directed to hear "and
determine defendant's motion to strike the prior conviction
on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments. If it determines that the prior
conviction is constitutionally valid, the trial court is further
directed to reinstate the jury verdicts
and undertake all
,
23The instruction given, CALJIC No. 52, 'provides in relevant part as
follows: ' 'The character of the witnesses, as shown by the evidence,
should be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining their
credibility, that is whether or not they have spoken the truth. The jury
may scrutinize the manner of witnesses while on the stand, and may consider their relation to the case. if any. and also their degree of intelligence. A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption, however. may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies; his interest in
the ease. if any. or his bias or prejudice. if any, for or against one or any
of the parties; by the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting
ltis character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by contradictory evidence."
24Distinguishable from the case at bench is PeopZe v. Torre. (1964) 61
Ca1.2d 264 [37 Cal.Rptr. 889, 391 P.2d 161]. There the exclusion of evidence relating to an alibi defense as to one count of the indictment W88
Itl'hI to be pre.iudicial error, and we further held that the error, although
)lot I"elating directly to the alibi defense as to an additional count, was
also prejudieial as to that count. We reasoned that defendant's credibility was in issue as to both counts and that" the atmosphere of falsity
infected the whole of his defense." (61 Ca1.2d at p. 268.) However,
although the TOfTe. opinion does not explicitly outline the testimony 88
to the additional count, we think it a fair inference that the evidence was
cloijcly balanced as to the identity of the wrongdoer, and that thereforo
the admission of evidence erroneously excluded might have tipped the
balance in favor of the defendant. In the instant case, on the other hand,
we evaluf-te the effect of evidence not excluded but erroneously admitted,
nnd we conclude as to counts 5 and 6 that, in view of the convincing and
extensive evidence produced by the prosecution, there is no reasonable
possibili~ that lueh erroneous admission contributed to the nrdicta.
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subsequent proceedings as may be necessary in the premises or
rendered proper by motions of the parties. If it determines
that the prior conviction is constitutionally invalid, the trial
court is directed (1) to reinstate the jury verdicts as to
counts 5 and 6 and to undertake all subsequent proceedings as
may be necessary in the premises or rendered proper by
motions of the parties as to those counts, and (2) to proceed
according to law upon counts 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the information.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings under the directions and in
conformity with the views herein expressed.
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment and the opinion of the court
except for the holding that an· erroneous impeachment of
defendant by an unconstitutional prior felony conviction
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to counts 5
and 6.
Although there is more evidence of felonious intent on
counts 5 and 6 than on counts 3, 4, 7, and 8, there is a direct
conflict on all counts between defendant's testimony and the
prosecution's evidence of felonious intent. Since any evidence
introduced to impeach defendant's credibility would apply to
all counts, it is highly unlikely that a jury would assess
defendant's credibility on a count-by-count basis. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 3.) When a defendant's credibility is
in issue, error affecting his credibility as to any count necessarily affects all counts in which credibility is in issue. (People
v. Torres, 61 Ca1.2d 264,267 [37 Cal.Rptr. 889, 391 P.2d 161].)
If, as the majority opinion correctly concludes, the jury might
not have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's testimony was false as to counts 3~ 4, 7, and 8, in the
absence of the impeaching evidence, it likewise might not have
been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's
. testimony was false as to counts 5 and 6.
Peters, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September
21, 1967. Traynor, C. J., and Peters, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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